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ABSTRACT 
 Thousands of ISIS fighters and supporters, over 4,000 children being among 
them, were displaced after the Islamic State’s proclaimed caliphate collapsed in 2019. 
While some countries have been either ambivalent or completely against repatriating ISIS 
children, other countries have planned to accept them back. This leads to several 
questions: are current deradicalization and disengagement programs applicable to the 
children of ISIS? Would these programs help to reintegrate children back into society? 
Are different approaches needed? To better answer these questions, the research in this 
thesis extracts key themes present in current deradicalization and disengagement 
programs and compares those themes with the factors motivating children to join terrorist 
organizations. Through qualitative analysis, this thesis finds that current programs are 
largely prison-based and place heavy emphasis on addressing radical ideologies and 
providing social aid. Unfortunately, these programs are not suited for child reintegration 
and are unprepared to handle the unique cognitive and social aspects of adolescents. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends that current deradicalization and disengagement 
programs replace strategies that address ideology and provide untailored social aid with 
programs that address positive peer contacts, foster constructive social networking, and 
provide psychological counseling and guidance, so that the children of ISIS can be 
successfully reintegrated back into society. 
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The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State (IS) or 
by the Arabic acronym Daesh, grabbed the attention of the world through its rapid 
expansion and gruesome, violent extremism. This group was able to seize and control 
territory inside Syria and Iraq the size of Britain that contained a population of eight million 
people.1 Thousands of Muslims from around the world flocked to ISIS when it claimed to 
have established the caliphate under its leader and self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. During the height of its three-year rule starting in 2014, large swaths of 
followers including thousands of foreign citizens as well as children and adolescents 
traveled to Iraq and Syria in order to join ISIS and its attempt to rebuild the caliphate. Now 
that ISIS has experienced a loss of territory at the hands of an aerial campaign headed by 
the United States, foreign fighters are attempting to return to their host countries.  
Unfortunately, many countries are ill-equipped to handle this group of former ISIS 
affiliates. While some countries refuse to repatriate their citizens altogether, other countries 
are accepting returnees on the condition that they be imprisoned and tried in court. Still, 
others may be forced or offered the opportunity to participate in deradicalization and 
disengagement programs. Especially alarming however, is the underestimation of children 
and the role they play in this extremist group. Hundreds of children were born inside the 
territory controlled by the Islamic State, while thousands more traveled to the region with 
their families in support of ISIS. These children, called “cubs of the caliphate” by ISIS 
leadership, are being exposed to gruesome conflict and suffering both physically and 
psychologically because of their association with the group. A PBS Frontline documentary 
interviewed children who escaped ISIS and learned that children are being indoctrinated to 
commit suicide attacks with a focus on Western targets.2 Not only are children witnessing 
beheadings, torture, combat, and sexual violence; some are engaging in these atrocities 
                                                 
1 Daniel L. Byman, “Where Will the Islamic State Go Next?,” Brookings (blog), June 25, 2018, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/25/where-will-the-islamic-state-go-next/. 
2 Public Broadcasting Station, “Children of ISIS,” YouTube video, 10:40, November 23, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VPiJr3qBEc&t=11s. 
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themselves. Videos released by ISIS show children undergoing militarized training such as 
handling weapons, movement under fire drills, and physical fitness testing.3 The purpose 
of this thesis is to determine whether the deradicalization and disengagement literature that 
describes and evaluates the rehabilitation of Islamic extremists is applicable to the children 
currently returning from ISIS. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
In many cultures and throughout history, children came to be used in warfare. From 
the Roman empire, where children were used as messengers, and through both world wars 
of the 20th century, children have participated in military violence and war. In 1949, 
children younger than 15 were prohibited from being enlisted or used for military purposes 
by the Geneva Conventions. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
recognized these acts as war crimes.4 Despite this effort to criminalize the use of children, 
they continued to be used in the 1980 Iran-Iraq war to clear minefields and act as the first 
wave of attacks to clear the path for Iranian militias.5 Unfortunately, children today are 
still being used as soldiers in warfare, despite almost universal condemnation from 
the international community. Some evidence suggests that children under 18 are serving 
as combatants in 75% of the world’s conflicts and 80% of these children are under the 
age of 15.6 
Most recently, ISIS used children as weapons in its battle to establish a caliphate. 
These children were not just natives to Iraq and Syria, but had traveled from all over the 
world to join this extremist organization. A report from the International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalization at King’s College London confirms that “41,490 citizens from 80 
countries travelled to Syria and Iraq, a quarter of which were women and minors” between 
                                                 
3 “ISIS’ Children: Soldiers Trained to Kill and Die,” YouTube video, 12:21, posted by Channel 4 
News, October 1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVxZfP1fC_I. 
4 United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” A/CONF.183/9 § (2002). 
5 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 86. 
6 Deborah Browne, “Children as Agents of Terrorism and Political Conflict,” in Routledge Handbook 
of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2019), 135. 
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April 2013 and June 2018.7 Of these citizens, 4,640 (12%) were minors. In July of 2017, 
ISIS had retreated from its stronghold in Mosul and continued to lose their proclaimed 
capital Raqqa in October of 2017, leaving Syria’s Deir al-Zour and Iraq’s Anbar Province 
as their remaining strongholds.8 Finally, in March of 2019, U.S. backed Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) declared unilateral victory over ISIS when they militarily took back the last 
scrap of ISIS  held territory in Baghouz.9 This near complete defeat has created hundreds 
of displaced ISIS supporters who are looking to leave the Middle East and return home. 
Now that the proclaimed caliphate has collapsed, the children who were either brought by 
their parents to Syria/Iraq or traveled there on their own are beginning to or attempting to 
return to their host countries.  
But how should receiving countries address this unique phenomenon? Practitioners 
and counterterrorism analyst are accepting a new consensus that believes “to defeat the 
threat posed by Islamic extremism and terrorism, there is a need to go beyond security and 
intelligence measures.”10 In other words, counterterrorism efforts must actively prevent 
radicalization from occurring to begin with and adopt rehabilitative efforts for those 
individuals who have already embraced extremism. Several Middle Eastern, European, and 
Southeast Asian countries are already combining preventative measures with more kinetic 
aspects of counterterrorism.11 In other words, the crisis of returning ISIS supporters can 
best be addressed through deradicalization and disengagement efforts. Unfortunately, 
many countries seem to overlook the importance of involving children in these efforts. This 
                                                 
7 Joana Cook and Gina Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Woman and Minors of the 
Islamic State” (King’s College London: ICSR, 2018), 7. 
8 Tim Meko, “Now That the Islamic State Has Fallen in Iraq and Syria, Where Are All Its Fighters 
Going?,” Washington Post, February 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-
returning-fighters/.m  
9 “ISIS Loses Its Final Stronghold in Syria,” CBS News, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/video/isis-
loses-its-final-stronghold-in-syria/. 
10 Angel Rabasa et al., “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xiii.; 
United Nations, Department of Public Information, General Assembly Unanimously Adopts Resolution 
Calling for Strong Coordinated Action by Member States to Tackle Terrorism, Violent Extremism 
Worldwide. GA/12035, June 26, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12035.doc.htm. 
11 Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, 22 C.F.R. §2656f (2017), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organizations/272488.pdf. 
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new vulnerable group of children returning from ISIS will pose a unique challenge for 
countries who plan to accept them back. However, very few countries have agreed to 
repatriate the children of ISIS members. Nine countries including Russia who has returned 
27 children to the Moscow region, France who recently returned three orphaned children 
to Paris from a Kurdish-camp in Syria, and Tunisia who has returned 9 children from camps 
in Libya, have initiated some repatriation efforts.12 Other European countries and the 
United States are cautious to set such a precedent and remain firm in their decision to not 
accept returnees. As countries continue to debate and prolong the decision to repatriate 
these children, a vast majority will continue to be held inside refugee camps or detention 
facilities alongside hardline defiant ISIS supporters and without proper medical treatment. 
Footage by Quentin Sommerville from inside al-Hol internment camp in Syria shows 
children as young as two being held alongside ultra-extremists who continue to be spew 
malice laced with toxic ideology and call for the death of the United States while justifying 
the actions of IS.13 Ultimately, it is important to reconcile these gaps in order to effectively 
rehabilitate the younger generation of afflicted youth and stop them from becoming a 
model for radicalization of future generations. 
B. CLARIFYING TERMINOLOGY 
While terminology such as radicalization, deradicalization, counter radicalization, 
and disengagement are used throughout the literature their true definitions are often not 
clear. Occasionally, the terms themselves are used interchangeably when in fact they are 
quite different. This thesis will establish basic definitions of commonly used terminology 
for clarity and consistency. 
                                                 
12 Elian Peltier, “France Repatriates Several Orphan Children Who Were Stranded in Syria,” New 
York Times, March 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/europe/france-isis-repatriates-
children.html.; Maxime Popov and Olga Rotenberg, “Russia Pioneering Return of ‘ISIS Children,’” ABS-
CBN News, last modified February 18, 2019, https://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/02/18/19/russia-
pioneering-return-of-isis-children.; “Tunisia: Scant Help to Bring Home ISIS Members’ Children,” Human 
Rights Watch, February 12, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/12/tunisia-scant-help-bring-home-
isis-members-children. 
13 Quentin Sommerville, “The Women and Children No-One Wants,” BBC, last modified April 12, 
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47867673. 
5 
In line with John Horgan’s definition, radicalization is “the social and 
psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or 
religious ideology. Radicalization may not necessarily lead to violence but is one of several 
risk factors required for this.”14 Thus deradicalization and disengagement should be used 
to describe the opposite processes of undermining and reversing the completed 
radicalization process. The term deradicalization “is cognitively oriented, encompassing 
the gradual dissolution of the extremist worldview that legitimizes and encourages terrorist 
violence.”15 Two terms often misused in place of deradicalization are disengagement and 
counter-radicalization. According to Naureen Fink and Ellie Hearne, disengagement is a 
behavioral change which can include altering one’s role within a group or leaving it 
outright. Tore Bjorgo defines it as “getting individuals and groups involved in terrorism to 
give up their participation in such activities.”16 Thus, disengagement “does not necessitate 
a change in values or ideals but requires relinquishing the objective of achieving change 
through violence.”17 This lies in contrast with deradicalization which implies a cognitive 
shift in understanding. Therefore, radicalization into and engagement with terrorist groups 
is akin to radicalization in thought and in action.18 On the other hand, the United Nations 
defines counter-radicalization as “deter(ing) disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) 
individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.”19 Counter-radicalization 
strategies and policies focus on preventing an individual from reaching the point of 
radicalization.  
                                                 
14 John G. Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and 
Extremist Movements, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 152. 
15 Liesbeth van der Heide and Bart Schuurman, “Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: 
Evaluating the Dutch Approach,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 17 (December  2018): 198. 
16 Tore Bjorgo, Strategies for Preventing Terrorism (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 87. 
17 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and 
Disengagement from Violent Extremism” (New York, NY: International Peace Institute, 2008), 3. 
18 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves 
an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 1 
(January 2014): 69–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849916. 
19 Shandon Harris-Hogan, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit, “What Is Countering Violent 
Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and 
Political Aggression 8, no. 1 (2016): 6. 
6 
In short, disengagement includes changing individual or collective behavior or 
instruments from violent to nonviolent means whereas deradicalization points to a 
fundamental cognitive shift in belief.20  Although some terrorist may wish to give up 
violence or their radical beliefs, a lack of disengagement opportunities leaves them stuck 
as members of a terrorist group. Hence, a terrorist can be deradicalized in thought but not 
inevitably disengaged in action. Fundamentally, reintegration (or rehabilitation) programs 
for terrorists strive for disengagement, deradicalization, or both. Programs will often 
facilitate deradicalization through ideological counternarratives put forth by credible 
religious leaders. On the other hand, disengagement efforts usually involve providing 
social aid, vocational training, or monetary support to help an individual meet basic needs 
and reintegrate into society. This thesis will fundamentally discuss both deradicalization 
and disengagement because although the two ideas are definitionally separate, they are 
connected. This author believes that when an individual decides to act, there are thoughts 
or cognitive ideas that support taking said action. For example, when an individual decides 
to radicalize and join a terrorist group there is a change in both the moral compass and the 
utility justification of violence or terrorism that allows them to justify doing so. Therefore, 
it is imperative to study both deradicalization and disengagement because the two are 
intrinsically connected.  
The definition of a child can be biological, legal, and social in nature. Biologically, 
a child is a person that falls between the stages of birth and puberty.21 Legally, the term 
child denotes a person below a set age limit. For example, The United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child defines child as “a human being below the age of 18 years unless 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”22 As of 2005, 192 of 
194 member countries have ratified the Convention. In the United States, Immigration Law 
                                                 
20 Anna Mühlhausen, “Conflict Management, Transitional Justice and De-Radicalization—Different, 
but Common Goals,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 9 (2016): 267. 
21 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “child,” accessed December 3, 2018, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/child.  
22 United Nations G.A. A/RES/44/25, 61st Plen Mtg. (1989), 
https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm.  
7 
refers to a child as anyone who is under the age of 21.23 Socially, the definition of a child 
can vary by culture, however there is a general agreement that childhood is a time or space 
distinguishable from adulthood. For this thesis, the term children/child will refer to those 
individuals ranging from ages 6–18. Those below the age of 6 will be considered toddlers 
and those above the age of 18 will be considered young adults. The term teenager or 
adolescent may be used to describe those children that fall between the ages of 13–18. The 
term minor may be used to describe any individual below the age of 18. 
C. FINDINGS 
Children appear to be joining terrorist groups for multiple reasons, but studies about 
radicalization into violent extremism reveals three broad categories that contribute to this 
process, they are structural, social, and individual. Structural conditions influence the 
climate around which child recruitment occurs. Also known as the root causes of terrorism, 
these conditions include “state repression, relative deprivation, poverty, and injustice,” all 
which can make a person resort to violence.24 Social factors include familial bonds or 
friendship networks that may influence a child’s decision to join extremist groups. Peer 
networks or social groups appear to be the most prominent explanation of why children 
join terrorist groups. There are also a large number of children who were brought to by 
family members or were born inside territory held by terrorist organizations. Individual 
factors are the unique psychological traits of each child that make them more susceptible 
to radicalization. At such a young age, children have certain personality traits (like the 
desire to engage in risky behavior) and psychological characteristics (like emotional 
instability and the need to obtain an identity separate from their parents) that increase their 
risk of turning to terrorist groups. Terrorist groups often attract children because they offer 
a sense of belonging and adventure, and give children the ability to stand for something 
greater than themselves. Because of this clear issue of children being radicalized and 
                                                 
23 Aliens and Nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2016), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1101. 
24 Matteo Vergani et al., “The Three Ps of Radicalisation: Push, Pull and Personal: A Systematic 
Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalisation into Violent Extremism,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, (September 2018): 3. 
8 
joining terrorist groups, deradicalization and disengagement programs are beginning to 
receive more attention. 
More and more countries are beginning to adopt deradicalization and 
disengagement policies as opposed to more kinetic options to help (ex-)terrorist become 
members of society once more. While an exact number of programs is currently unknown 
due to the secret and sometimes informal nature of them, the number of countries claiming 
to have some sort of deradicalization or disengagement policy in place is increasing. These 
programs are largely run by religious leaders, government officials, teachers, psychologist, 
security officials, therapist, and counselors. Although deradicalization and disengagement 
have received considerable attention, programs remain under researched, unclear, and 
contentious. The way in which they are designed, implemented, and practiced in the real 
world is difficult to assess and “their effectiveness has not undergone independent scrutiny 
and its degree is largely a matter of opinion.”25 Two major themes that appear in the 
literature describing elements of deradicalization and disengagement programs are 
ideological counternarratives and social aid. Many deradicalization programs around the 
world focus largely on addressing radical ideological beliefs. The idea is to take a 
radicalized individual and subject him or her to moderate views through credible religious 
leaders, more often than not, through prison reform programs. Disengagement efforts 
largely incorporate social aid in the form of monetary support, vocational training, food 
and clothing, and workshops which are intended to provide a former terrorist with the basic 
skills to provide for his or her self and family, and to stay detached from the terrorist group. 
Many countries may use deradicalization as an umbrella term to describe their program 
when it in fact does foster disengagement through some type of social aid.  
Overall, when considering how applicable and effective current programs will be 
for children, two big issues are present. First, programs fail to address the primary 
motivating forces that propel children to join terrorist groups, namely family, peer 
networks, and social identity. If these forces are not addressed, a child can end up being 
                                                 
25 Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How 
Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” Advances in Political Psychology 35 (2014): 88. 
9 
influenced by the same original factors and return to affiliating with terrorists. Current 
programs put heavy emphasis on ideological strategies of deradicalization, and while 
ideology should not be completely ignored, it should not be the primary focus for children. 
Instead, programs need educational campaigns aimed at reducing the alienation and 
embitterment of diaspora youth.26 Also, programs should address social networks by 
fostering positive intergroup contact and enhancing a child’s sense of acceptance by their 
host societies. Second, current programs emphasize providing deradicalized individuals 
with social aid to help them reintegrate into society at the expense of psychological 
counseling and aftercare. Children experience unique social and cognitive psychological 
developments when compared to adults. Children are at a stage in their life where their 
decision-making skills are not fully developed and may influence their decision to join a 
terrorist group. Children are also more adversely affected by the gruesome results of 
terrorism. Therefore, deradicalization and disengagement programs for children should 
emphasize psychological counseling and address emotional trauma instead of teaching 
vocational skills and obtaining monetary support.27 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis relied on qualitative methods of analysis and secondary sources to 
answer several questions: What are the key characteristic of deradicalization and 
disengagement programs? Can current programs be applied to children? Why are children 
joining terrorist groups? How does terrorism effect the psychology of a child? Published 
sources that are publicly available such as government reports, books, scholarly articles, 
and Internet articles were used. The goal was to extract key themes present in current 
deradicalization and disengagement programs and compare those themes with the factors 
motivating children to join terrorist organizations. The intention of this thesis was to 
identify gaps in the deradicalization and disengagement literature when it is applied to 
children so that baseline solutions can be introduced and built upon in the near future. 
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The research in this thesis was applied to the children in Syria and Iraq as of May 
2018 that had links to Belgium. The federal Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) 
in Brussels estimates 162 children are linked to Belgium, this includes “13 teenagers (aged 
12–18 and thus listed as Foreign Terrorist Fighters).”28 These children have at minimum 
one parent who was a citizen or resident of Belgium. Since almost 5,000 children are linked 
to ISIS, this thesis focused on this particular group of Belgian children because sufficient 
literature exists about who they are and why they joined ISIS. This thesis referred to an 
ethnographic study that focused on the families of Belgian and Dutch children who left for 
Syria in order to provide an in-depth look into the lives of those children who ultimately 
left Belgium to join ISIS. The study, conducted by senior researcher Marion van San, 
focused on what role the families of these children played in the departure decision and 
radicalization process of their children. While this thesis focused on a particular group of 
Belgian children, the data was overall limited. Therefore, the author relied on studies of 
children from countries outside of the caliphate such as Northern Uganda, Jordan, Yemen, 
Congo, Iraq, Nepal, and Gaza to illustrate the effects of conflict on children. 
Chapter I of this thesis is a broad introduction of the topic. Chapter II reviews the 
conditions or motivating factors that propel children into terrorist groups. It also explores 
the different physical and psychological effects that terrorism and association with terrorist 
groups has on children. Chapter III examines the available literature on deradicalization 
and disengagement programs and extracts the main strategies being used to deradicalize 
and disengage Islamic extremists. It also discusses the claimed successes of these programs 
and highlights the questionable effectiveness of such strategies. Chapter IV compares what 
we know about children and why they join terrorist groups with the current strategies and 
practices of deradicalization and disengagement programs. The concluding chapter 
discusses the applicability and effectiveness of these programs when applied to children 
and offers suggestions on how best to fill the gaps identified. 
                                                 
28 Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet, eds., Returnees: Who Are They, Why Are They (Not) Coming 
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II. FACTORS THAT PROPEL CHILDREN INTO 
RADICALIZATION 
The reasons that people have for joining terrorist groups are expansive and cannot 
be narrowed down to any single factor. An early hypothesis of the 1970s, that was centered 
around adults, believed terrorists suffered from personality disorders and displayed 
clinically psychopathic behavior.29 This idea hinted at an element of madness among 
members. However, this claim of a terrorist pathology or profile fails to be backed by 
empirical evidence. In fact, psychologist Ken Heskin who studied the psychology of 
terrorism in Northern Ireland supports that most terrorists are not diagnosable psychopathic 
or otherwise clinically or emotionally disturbed.30 Although studies often downplay 
psychological explanations of adult participation in terrorist groups, the psychology of 
children is uniquely different and plays a larger role in their decision to join a terrorist 
group. Laurence Steinburg, a psychologist that specializes in child and adolescent 
psychological development, claims that adolescents may engage in risky behavior because 
“they have not yet fully acquired the mental ability to curb impulsive behavior or to make 
entirely rational judgments.”31 Research by developmental psychologist Erick Erickson 
emphasizes one of the most important social developments in youth is the search for 
identity and new attachments.32 Erickson also points out that this search may lead youth 
to take on negative or undesirable identities. As undesirable as a terrorist identity may be, 
youth are experiencing intense exploration of personal values, goals, and beliefs, which 
may rationalize or make membership in a terrorists group appealing. Nonetheless, we can 
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go beyond psychology to better understand what factors propel children into joining 
terrorist groups by using structural, social, and individual levels of analysis. 
Studies about radicalization into violent extremism reveals three broad categories 
that contribute to this process, they are structural, social, and individual. Structural factors 
influence the climate around which child recruitment occurs. Social factors include familial 
bonds or friendship networks that may influence a child’s decision to join extremist groups. 
Individual factors are the unique psychological traits of each child that make them more 
susceptible to radicalization. Social factors are different than individual ones because they 
include the relationships formed with other people and they explain how those external 
sources can put pressure on a child to radicalize, whereas individual factors are solely 
intrinsic to the individual themselves. These three categories encompass a number of risk 
factors that may increase the likelihood of a child being radicalized into violent extremism. 
Although no single component can explain why children join terrorist groups, when 
considered altogether, these risk factors serve as a baseline for understanding why children 
are radicalized.  
This chapter will begin with a description of each propelling factor supported with 
real world examples. Next, some time will be devoted to exploring the reasons why a group 
of Dutch and Belgian youth made the decision to go to Syria and join ISIS. Then, the 
physical and psychological consequences or effects children face due to joining extremist 
groups will be discussed to highlight the multitude of complications they may encounter 
after leaving such groups. The goal of this chapter is to provide a basic understanding of 
the factors that push children into radicalization and the effects of joining extremist groups 
in order to later determine whether current deradicalization programs, which will be 
discussed in length in Chapter III, are effectively addressing these issues.  
A. STRUCTURAL, SOCIAL, AND INDIVIDUAL FACTORS 
1. Structural 
Structural-level conditions create an environment that allows violent political 
actors to emerge and the recruitment of children into armed groups to occur. These 
conditions, also called the root causes of terrorism, may make people resort to violence and 
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include, marginalization, poverty, unemployment, economic underdevelopment, state 
repression, and injustice.33 O’Neil and Broeckhoven argue, “it would be hard for children 
to engage in political violence without some larger political conflict—real or perceived—
around which to orient their actions.”34 When certain structural factors are in disorder or 
the country is in a state of war, the conducive and necessary environment for terrorist 
groups to thrive is created which ultimately puts children at risk for engagement with these 
groups. Structural-level issues can also contribute to a sense of grievance, grievances being 
among the longest-standing explanations when it comes to theorizing about why people 
revolt or engage in other acts of political violence, including terrorism.35 These issues may 
influence the political or sociological conditions that give rise to radicalization. Examples 
of structural factors that may push children into radicalization include being subjected to 
and falling victim to hostile foreign policies from Western states, being victimized from 
civil war or deep-rooted conflicts, and being marginalized or socially excluded from 
society. A report published by Quilliam, a counter-extremism think tank based in London, 
describes how children of the Islamic State are pushed by the desire to escape difficulties 
as a result of insecurity and pulled by a promise of change, the ability to fight for a 
meaningful cause, and the chance to partake in adventure.36 Ultimately, structural-level 
conditions “serve as the backdrop in which child recruitment and use by armed groups 
occurs, creating additional pressures on civilians, exacerbating needs, and highlighting and 
amplifying existing societal cleavages and tensions.”37 Muslim youth in the UK and the 
Netherlands provide an example of how social exclusion can lead to radicalization. 
In the wake of the London underground bombing in 2005, London police 
documented a sudden increase in faith-based hate crimes and hostility towards Muslim 
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communities, including physical and verbal attacks, property damage, and attacks on 
mosques.38 When three of the four bombers were identified as British Muslims, the public 
began to focus on issues of integration, human rights, immigration, and multiculturalism. 
As a result, xenophobia began to rise based on the “assumption that terror can be a product 
of a specific culture within the greater European society.”39 In return, some authors claim 
that British leaders began to place more emphasis on Islamic terrorism being a threat to the 
British culture and stressed the need for Muslims living in Britain to adopt British values.40 
Consequently, the causes for radicalization were assumed by politicians and academics 
alike to be a result of British Muslim youth growing up in segregated communities. 
However, this explanation leaves out the victimization, threats to personal safety, poor 
relations with police, and purposeful exclusion by society these Muslims faced. The story 
of Maajid Nawaz, a Western-born Muslim of Pakistani background, is a testament to the 
struggle many Muslim’s face in Western societies. In his book Radical, Nawaz describes 
his journey out of radicalization, but starts by describing several instances in his childhood 
in Essex, England that contributed to his radicalization. While in primary school, Nawaz 
recalls being forced by the lunch lady to eat pork sausages despite his tear and pleas and 
he eventually vomited out of discomfort.41 While he does not blame the lunch lady entirely, 
he felt there was a lazy cultural ignorance behind the incident and the woman never stopped 
to think that there may be a religious reason behind why he could not eat the pork. Also, 
when Nawaz was about ten or eleven, he remembers his friends began to define him by his 
skin tone, something they had never done before. “His kind” was blamed for AIDS and he 
was no longer able to play football at lunch because “this game’s not for Pakis.”42 Overall 
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it was this early rejection by peers and exposure to racism and indifference that soiled his 
childhood innocence and contributed to his radicalization.  
Additionally, inside of the Netherlands, a negative climate towards Islam and 
Muslim communities increased after the 9/11 attacks and the murder of film maker Theo 
van Gogh. This caused Dutch society to socially exclude and polarize their views towards 
Muslims while increasing the number of attacks on mosque and Islamic communities. This 
exclusion has particularly affected second and third-generation Muslim youth of Moroccan 
decent who have a 40% unemployment rate and whose youth crime rates reach 50%.43 
According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) these youth are 
especially vulnerable to resorting to violent jihad due to a lack of integration, perceived 
threats to the group, low economic status, being socially excluded, and experiencing 
inequality.44 As a result of this marginalization and failure to peacefully mix with host 
societies cultural values, some Muslim youth may have turned to Islam in an identity crisis 
and subsequently become radicalized by other extremists.45 
2. Social 
Social factors, including ideology, group belonging, and group mechanisms, are the 
aspects that make extremist groups and  their particular lifestyle attractive to some people. 
According to Vergani et al., group dynamics such as the direct influence of peers, the 
development of robust bonds with like-minded people, and the influence of family and 
kinship ties are cited 35% of the time as pull factors relevant to radicalization.46 The 
networks that children form with their peer’s help facilitate and make the initial steps to 
radicalization less challenging. This idea is similar to what has been demonstrated in the 
literature concerning juvenile gang membership. Various aspects of childhood and early 
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adolescence push individuals into gangs including delinquent peers and aggressive 
friendships.  
According to a U.S. Department of Justice bulletin on juvenile gangs, adolescence 
is a time where peer relations fluctuate often and commitments to both gangs and peers 
within it are often transitory. However, becoming a member of a gang is more likely if an 
individual “associates with peers who engage in delinquent behavior” such as underage 
drinking, use of illicit drugs, truancy from school, theft, and sexual activity .47 Another 
risk factor for gang membership includes a sustained pattern of bellicose friendships, 
especially childhood friendships that continue into adolescents, among youth who are 
antisocial and truculent themselves.48 This “association with aggressive peers during 
childhood and early adolescence” is one indicator of future association with gangs “as is 
the experience of having been rejected by peers.”49 In essence, one can think of peers as 
the gateway into gangs or violent extremist groups. As children seek to define their identity 
and strengthen their peer relations, they succumb to the pressure exercised within these 
tightly knit groups of close friends. Friends tend to join a cause together, and if that 
particular cause supports the activities of a gang or terrorist group, the individuals within 
are at a higher risk for joining or radicalizing into those organizations. The emphasis here 
is on the group dynamics of peer networks, which are highly influential in a child’s 
connection with terrorist groups. That is to say, “spontaneous group interaction with one’s 
peers rather than planned systematic brain-washing and indoctrination” is a vital 
component in becoming a terrorist.50 
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According to the anthropologist Scott Atran, “about three out of every four people 
who join Al Qaeda or ISIS do so through friends, most of the rest through family or fellow 
travelers in search of a meaningful path in life.”51 Moreover, the theory of terrorism put 
forth by Marc Sageman called “a bunch of guys” maintains that the decision to join a 
terrorist group “is based on pre-existing friendship ties” and “that the evolving group of 
future perpetrators seemed more akin to” such connections “than a formal terrorist cell, 
with well-defined hierarchy and division of labour.”52 His theory affirms the role that 
friendship and peer networks play in inspiring individuals to become Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters (FTF). To gather further information on the motivations of FTFs, the United 
Nations Centre for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT) alongside participating UN member 
states, directly interviewed 43 returnees from the conflict in Syria involving ISIS. When 
questioned about the role of friends and social networks in the radicalization process, 
32.5% of respondents claimed they were directly motivated by their peers or relatives to 
leave for Syria. Of these, two individuals insisted the encouragement by their friends was 
“very important,” and for 12 other individuals it was “extremely important.”53 While this 
ratio is not as high as Atran’s, it clearly shows that peer pressure and social networks are 
influential in a person’s commitment to become a FTF. This same study shows that social 
networks, or being inspired by other members within a peer group to become a FTF in 
Syria, is especially prominent among Europeans when compared to their Arab counterparts 
who they claim are usually motivated by regional or domestic factors and are less 
dependent on others to reach conflict zones due to geographical proximity and knowledge 
of local culture.54  
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Donatella Della Porta’s study on underground political groups found that cliques 
of friends or family dynasties motivate an individual to join radical groups.55 Her research 
was conducted in 1992 and was based on multiple case studies that consisted of in-depth 
interviews with former or current members of underground organizations. She found that 
eventually these underground political friendship networks became so strong that they cut 
off communication with outsiders and drove their moderate stances into more radically 
political ones. Similarly, in 2004, Marc Sageman attempted to understand terror networks 
by conducting research on Salafi jihadist members using public documents like court 
transcripts, government documents, scholarly articles, and internet resources. Although he 
admits his resources are not completely representative of the global Salafi jihad, which 
leave out children, his research on the social backgrounds of new global Salafi Mujahideen 
fighters found that 68 % of Mujahideen members joined due to preexisting friendship 
bonds.56 He also noted that many members joined in small clusters of friends. 
Finally, one should understand the importance of family. Sageman research points 
out that kinship bonds and family involvement with the terrorist group influenced 14% of 
fighters to join. Rona Fields’s psychometric assessment of children in Northern Ireland 
found that exposure to terrorism as a child can lead to a proclivity for terrorism as an 
adult.57 Thus, a child growing up with family members who are members of a terrorist 
group or who support the activities of a terrorist group, are more likely to join themselves. 
Also, a child who is trying to escape a lack of positive relationships among family members 
may become vulnerable to extremists group membership. More examples of peer networks 
leading to radicalization can be found in the United States and different parts of the UK. 
In 2015, U.S. Minnesota federal officials arrested six young men between the ages 
of 19–21 who planned to join ISIS in Syria. In an interview, the United States attorney for 
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Minnesota, Andrew Luger, is quoted saying “this circle of friends recruited each other.”58 
It was the sense of camaraderie, the collective radical ideology, and the guidance they 
received electronically from one of their friends who joined the Islamic State in 2014 that 
pushed these youth to join ISIS. Another example of peers joining ISIS includes the six 
young men ages 19–31 who called themselves the Britani Brigade Bangladeshi Bad Boys. 
Each of these young men came from the same neighborhood in Portsmouth, England and 
had a pre-existing network from frequenting the same Islamic groups and mosques.59 More 
recently, news has brought global attention to a girl by the name of Shamima Begum who 
is attempting to return home after supporting ISIS.  
Shamima (age 15) traveled with two peers, Kadiza Sultana (age 16) and Amira 
Abase (age 15), from Gatwick, England to join ISIS in 2015. All three of the girls (also 
known as the Bethnal trio) were following the footsteps of their friend Sharmeena Begum 
(age 15) who traveled to Syria four months before them. The Bethnal trio are reported to 
have been recruited by Scottish-born Aqsa Mahmood (age 21 in 2014), one of ISIS most 
successful female recruiters and first to voluntarily slip into Daesh territory, through the 
social media platform Twitter.60 This may not be surprising given that children are more 
vulnerable to predatory behavior than adults on social networking sites.61 Mahmood is a 
key figure online and in the al-Khanssaa brigade. This all-female brigade is based in al-
Raqqa and is responsible for enforcing ISIS version of Sharia. Concerning the trio’s 
whereabouts, Shamima believes that Sultana, who married an American ISIS fighter, was 
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killed after her house in Raqqa was bombed and Abase, who married an Australian ISIS 
fighter, is still alive in Baghouz. However, neither report on these girls has been confirmed. 
Days after arriving in Syria, Shamima married a Dutch convert to Islam by the name of 
Yago Riedijk. According to interviews, Shamima stated that she does not regret joining 
ISIS and claims that she did not do anything dangerous or create propaganda for the group 
but simply stayed a housewife and took care of her husband.62 On the other hand, her 
husband Riedijk admitted fighting for ISIS and said “he attended the stoning of a woman 
for ‘fornication,’ saw piles of dead bodies in the city and lost an infant daughter to 
malnutrition” while living under ISIS control.63 Recently, an article has revealed that 
Shamima was actually a member of Hisba, the most well-known and feared morality police 
units in the self-proclaimed caliphate. Backed by Western intelligence and an organization 
dedicated to documenting the violations of extremist in Syria (Sound and Picture), 
Shamima is accused of cruelly enforcing Sharia including the dress code for woman and 
attempting to recruit other girls including teenagers in Australia.64 Complicating matters 
further in regard to Shamima’s return is her infant son Jarrah, born in Syria in February of 
2019, who officials say has a right to British citizenship despite his mother’s actions. 
Unfortunately, Jarrah died in a refugee camp in Syria in March of 2019 due to health issues, 
but the complicating question of what to do with the children of known foreign ISIS 
supporters still remains. While not exhaustive, these stories shed light on the prominence 
of peer networks in pushing young individuals to link up with terrorist organizations. 
3. Individual 
Some people are more receptive than their peers, despite similar circumstances, to 
radicalization. This is because their individual factors or personal characteristics are 
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different. Individual factors may include distinct psychological susceptibilities 
independent of structural and social factors such as “mental health conditions, depression, 
trauma, personality traits such as narcissism and impulsivity, and individually-specific 
demographic characteristics” such as sex, age, education level, and income, that “constitute 
subjective states that make the individual more vulnerable to extremism.”65 Once again, a 
comparison can be drawn to personal factors that push children into gang membership. 
Youth who are victims of abuse or neglect, exhibit antisocial behavior, and engage in 
different forms of delinquency like alcohol and drug use, are considered to be at a higher 
risk for joining a gang.66 Similarly, children can be pulled toward terrorism if they perceive 
the need to obtain an identity or status, have certain personality traits, or have traumatic 
life experiences.  
Terrorist organizations often offer a child a sense of community, ambition, and the 
promise of acknowledgement and status if they work on the group’s behalf.67 Gangs mirror 
this experience by offering youth who lack acceptance and direction in their lives a 
community to turn to. Gangs tend to be at the centerfold of social life offering opportunities 
to interact with peers under an umbrella of perceived security.68 The gang itself establishes 
an identity for youth to buy into whether it be clothing, symbols, or tattoos. This unique 
identify fosters connectedness and individuals can act in the name of the collective.69 
Furthermore, achieving a legitimate social identity is especially difficult for Muslim youth 
who are forced to “negotiate their religious identity and religious practice in a context that 
includes explicit or subtle themes of misunderstanding, fear, and marginalization.”70 
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Feelings of social isolation or disenfranchisement by Muslim youth in the diaspora can 
create a loss of significance within the community at large. In different contexts, terrorist 
organizations can offer these youth forms of protection, mechanisms of revenge, or an 
escape from forms of physical, verbal, and mental abuses. Terrorist groups appear to be 
inclusive and understanding while offering a marginalized individual a chance to create a 
strong sense of self.  
Some children have personalities that desire to engage in risky behavior and 
experimentation. A study in the Frontiers in Psychology journal reveals that “young 
children show the strongest preference for risky compared to sure bet options of equal 
expected value, adolescents are intermediate in their risk preference, and young adults 
show the strongest risk aversion.”71 In general, experimental studies find that children and 
adolescents are likely to take more risks than adults.72 While some risk-taking behavior is 
natural, other times it can be problematic and lead youth to engage in delinquent acts with 
harmful consequences such as joining extremist groups. Let it be clear however, that 
personality traits alone cannot predict an individual’s propensity to join a terrorist group. 
In fact, research has shown that many terrorists are “normal” and generally do not exhibit 
psychological abnormalities or personality deficiencies.73 However, the personality and 
level of maturity of a child is vastly different than that of an adult and may offer further 
explanations of radicalization. A study in the Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 
explains how children between the ages of 10–15 move from being simple observers and 
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nonparticipants of sectarian violence to potential victims and or perpetrators.74 For a 
child’s emotional security about their community, violence is ventured to be a more 
striking threat because of “the presumed meaning this violence holds for the identity and 
well-being of the child in the community.”75 Therefore, if a child’s physical and 
psychological feelings of safety are put at risk, they are more likely to adopt overly 
aggressive, troubled, or even hazardous regulatory responses to conflict. 
Furthermore, children are more susceptible to being pulled toward radicalization 
through violent coercion by radical militants because they are easy to manipulate and 
control. In these cases, children join terrorist groups out of fear or through abduction. 
Examples include the thousands of children in northeastern Nigeria that have been captured 
by Boko Haram amidst frequent attacks on schools.76 In more recent times, ISIS has been 
responsible for abducting hundreds of children in order for them to become the next 
generation of fighters. A Frontline documentary called Children of ISIS interviews former 
ISIS child fighters who describe they joined ISIS because members threatened to kill their 
families, amputate their limbs, or murder them for resisting.77 
B. RADICALIZING CHILDREN INTO ISIS: A BELGIAN CASE STUDY 
Although citizens from many different European countries have traveled to Iraq 
and Syria to join the Islamic State, Belgium has taken an overwhelming role in providing 
fighters to the Middle East. Pieter Van Ostaeyen, an analyst of the conflict involving 
foreign jihadist in Syria, claims up to 450 fighters are directly from Belgium.78 While this 
number seems insignificant compared to countries like France where over 800 people have 
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joined ISIS, it is still a very sizeable cohort for a country of roughly 11 million people. This 
number is even more significant considering Belgium’s Muslim community makes up only 
7.6% of the population.79 According to Ostaeyen’s numbers and compared to other 
European countries, Belgium has averaged the most fighters per capita to the conflict in 
Syria and Iraq. Unfortunately, this number also includes children.  
These children are identified as having links to Belgium through direct citizenship 
or they were born under ISIS to at least one Belgian parent. In 2016, AIVD estimated a 
total of 70 Dutch children were in ISIS-controlled territories.80 In 2018, the federal 
Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) in Brussels estimated 162 children linked 
to Belgium, counting 13 teenagers (aged 12–18 and thus listed as Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters), were under ISIS control.81 The exact number of Belgian children born in ISIS 
territory is not known for certain; however, available data estimates “at least 730 infants 
from 19 countries have been born inside the caliphate” while “unverified estimates have 
suggested up to 5,000 children were born to foreign parents.”82 According to a study by 
Cook and Vale through the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), 
70% of Belgian minors (105 people) were born inside of ISIS territory.83 This is more than 
double the number of children and teenagers (45 people) that traveled to ISIS territory. 
There are also children of foreign nationalities being held inside refugee camps like the al-
Hawl camp in Syria, where as many as 30,000 people have arrived from Baghouz including 
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3,000 children.84 Also, there are children being held alongside their mothers who are in 
detention camps or prison awaiting to be tried for supporting the Islamic State.85 Therefore, 
it is safe to say an exact number of foreign children in the region may be unknown at this 
time, but it is clear that this number contains children from many European countries 
including Belgium. 
An ethnographic study conducted in 2016 by Marion van San helps illustrate why 
Belgian children decided to join ISIS. As a sociologist and criminologist, van San has 
focused most of her recent research on radicalism and extremism from a pedagogical 
perspective.86 In her study, she interviewed 26 different Dutch and Belgian families (16 
with immigrant backgrounds) with at least one child (under the age of 24) who has left for 
Syria to join ISIS and their armed struggle, to understand the family circumstances of these 
youth and to what extent the parents influenced their decision to depart and, therefore, 
radicalize. Even though each of these children lived in Belgium or the Netherlands, their 
families and backgrounds were unique. 
The familial and socio-economic situations of each family were relatively different. 
Some had financial problems in the past, and others had issues with alcohol and drugs. 
Some families reported incidents of domestic violence. Many were not very religious. 
Others grew up in single parent households, while one had experienced the death of a 
parent. The education levels varied from not finishing school to completing a higher 
secondary education. The occupations of the parents also varied from teacher to civil 
servant to health care assistants. Overall, van San concludes that most families did not 
actively push their children into leaving for Syria, but many were unaware, did not 
understand, or possibly denied the clear signs of radicalization before their children’s 
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departure. Many children exhibited signs of isolation, became more religious and embraced 
traditional Islamic values, and/or networked through friends and organizations like 
Sharia4Belgium. 
Looking back in hindsight, when several parents were interviewed after their child 
had left for Syria, they recalled their child becoming more isolated from their families and 
society. One child is quoted saying “mum I don’t belong here, I belong there [Syria]” while 
another child tells her parents “she wanted to leave for Syria because she felt unhappy in 
the Netherlands.”87 More parents observed their children locking themselves in their 
rooms and not partaking in family events while becoming more involved with what was 
going on in the Middle East. This may not be surprising considering many of the subjects 
were young adolescents who may have been seeking to break away from the identity of 
their parents or authority figures and find a new sense of self. ISIS ended up offering an 
attractive alternative for these children.  
Another factor several parents remembered was that their children became more 
involved with religion. For example, the mother of a girl named Sandra claimed her 
daughter became so devout that the family was no longer able to watch television, smoke, 
or go out to socialize because Sandra’s religion (Islam) forbids it.88 Sandra also frightened 
her mother to the point of fleeing their home because she called her mother a non-believer 
and claimed that she would burn in hell. Other children started wearing a niqab and got 
into conflicts at school when they were obstructed from practicing their religion as they 
desired. The school teacher of a boy named Adil recounts how after demanding he be 
allowed to pray at school, claimed “he had no ambition to continue studying, because he 
wanted to give up his live for the sake of Allah.”89 It should be stressed that religion itself 
was not the sole driving factor that pushed these children to join ISIS. Instead, it was one 
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of several risk factors that presented itself before their departure that should have alerted 
their parents. 
Finally, almost all of the children in this study had connections to peers or well-
known associates in organizations that supported the armed struggle in Syria. In one case, 
the mother of a boy named Samir admitted that her son started to create close contacts with 
a prominent member of Sharia4Belgium, a radical Salafist organization that calls for 
Belgium to convert itself into an Islamic State.90 This prominent member’s name was 
Ibrahim and he met his sister and her husband in Syria a few months before Samir arrived. 
Ibrahim, Samir’s neighbor and friend, played an important role in convincing and 
facilitating Samir’s travel to Syria. Other parents recall their children connecting to 
other like-minded people through meetings, demonstrations, mosque, or social media. 
These networks helped influence almost every child’s decision to leave Belgium behind 
and join ISIS. 
All in all, the factors that pushed these Belgian and Dutch children to radicalize and 
join the armed conflict in Syria coincide with the structural, social, and individual factors 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. Immigrant youth from second generation backgrounds 
felt marginalized from Belgian society or that they did not belong. They began to associate 
with like-minded peers and became increasingly connected through group meetings and 
activities. These groups gave these youth a unique sense of identity and purpose, their 
purpose being to support their Islamic “brothers” and “sisters” in the armed struggle in 
Syria. Although this sample is small, it provides a deeper understanding as to why children 
ultimately decide to join ISIS.  
C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORISTS 
GROUPS 
When looking beyond radicalization factors to the impacts of being a member of or 
associating with a terrorist group, it is clear that the life trajectories of children and child 
soldiers are adversely affected. Children, who depend heavily on parental care, can be 
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stripped from families and lose their loved ones, leaving an unstable emotional void. 
Children can also lose out on a formal education and become displaced inside refugee 
camps. They may become disabled or potentially die as an outcome of warfare and suffer 
psychologically from traumatic events. While this research does not attempt to go into 
depth on the multitude of effects that conflict as a result of being part of a terrorist group 
can have on children, it will separate them into two categories: physical and psychological. 
Having earlier established the factors that can propel children into radicalization, it is 
important to now reflect on the effects that conflict can have on them. The goal of this 
section is to provide insight into the types of events children may face or fall victim to as 
a result of joining extremist groups or associating with them because these events represent 
the obstacles children will face once they leave extremists groups, and if children are going 
to be deradicalized, disengaged, and reintegrated back into society, these effects must be 
properly addressed. 
1. Physical 
The physical impacts of war on children can potentially include the following: 
a. Death  
According to a 2018 UN report, over 10,000 children died worldwide from conflict 
in 2017 alone.91 This is an overall rise compared to the previous year, with the culprits 
mainly being non-state actors in Syria, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, 
Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Myanmar. In 2017, the Syrian 
Network For Human Rights reported that ISIS and other extremist group forces killed 
283 children below the age of eighteen, 258 in 2016, and 149 in 2015.92 Inside of a 
Kurdish-run internment camp, one Iraqi boy who survived the fighting in Baghouz 
exclaims that “in one day, at least 2,000 people were killed”; this included children, due to 
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ISIS setting off car bombs.93 The total number of children killed is likely to be much 
higher, considering that ISIS and the Syrian regime do not publicly release or record the 
total number of people killed.  
b. Injury/ Disability  
Children suffer a variety of war injuries. According to the Journal of Paediatrics 
and Child Health, in contrast to adults, children are far more likely to be killed or suffer 
serious injury from landmine explosions or IEDs.94 In Syria and Iraq, ISIS has used 
landmines for diversion operations and attacks, which have inflicted numerous casualties 
involving severe burns, deep cuts and abrasions, and limb amputations.95 ISIS is also 
notorious for cutting off the limbs of infidels, or those they define as unbelievers. Frontline 
reporter Evan Williams interviewed 14-year-old Omar, a child ISIS attempted to recruit, 
who explained how ISIS cut off his hand and foot to show other children what happens 
when you refuse to support the cause of the Islamic State.96 A six-year-old girl by the name 
of Nour, whose family stayed dedicated to ISIS till the final battle in Baghouz, was shot in 
the face by snipers and still had not received treatment 15 days after the shooting.97 
Furthermore, of the millions of children who will be incapacitated by war, many will have 
little to no access to rehabilitation services such as prosthetic limbs, physical therapy, 
mobility programs, and speech therapy.98 
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c. Illness  
War can severely limit the maintenance of a child’s health by impacting housing, 
water sanitation, access to immunizations and health facilities, food supply, and nutrition. 
A family who fled the heavy violence in Deir Ezzor, who are now trapped inside Eko 
refugee camp in Greece, anxiously talk to CNN correspondents about their 6-year-old son 
Alyaman Daar who suffers from muscular dystrophy and is slowly dying because they do 
not have access to proper medical equipment to provide him with oxygen, fluids, and 
food.99 Furthermore, Syria has been responsible for the largest number of refugees since 
WWII starting at the onset of its civil war in 2011. Many of these refugees, which include 
over 1,000 children, are forced to live in unsanitary camps. Hundreds of images scattered 
over social media sites and the Internet reveal the horrific conditions of many children 
displaced by the collapse of the Islamic State. Many children appear severely 
malnourished, unkempt, and living among large heaps of garbage and waste. A study in 
the Canadian Journal of Infectious Diseases & Medical Microbiology revealed that the 
displaced population in Syria has shown high pervasiveness of chronic diseases including 
measles, tuberculosis, cutaneous leishmaniasis, and polio.100 If left untreated, these 
conditions will have devastating effects.  
d. Sexual Exploitation  
Children are at risk, especially females, for being raped or prostituted. A U.S. State 
Department report on trafficking persons declared that “the government of Syria does not 
fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so” and the government did not “protect and prevent children from 
recruitment and use by government and pro-Syrian regime affiliated militias, armed 
opposition forces, and designated terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq 
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and Syria.”101 Unsurprisingly, ISIS has publicly established instructions on how to hold 
female slaves against their will and abuse them sexually. Testimony from Iraqi Yazidi 
children reveal ISIS fighters would auction them off as sex slaves to other fighters who 
would then rape or force sexual encounters on them including violent bondage or 
marriage.102 Other girls recall the transactions of the slave market and describe how 
militants would touch their legs and breasts like they were animals, and gravitate toward 
the girls they considered virgins.  
e. Education and Occupation  
In combat zones or territories where armed groups like the Islamic State rule, access 
to formal education is limited if not completely nonexistent. When child soldiers are 
compared to other children not involved in conflict, it is clear that the former are 
experiencing large gaps in education including literacy skills, life skills, and vocational 
training. Blattman and Annan conclude that “especially traumatic experiences during 
abduction had an adverse impact on education, less years of schooling, greater reading 
problems, lower occupational functioning, and lower work quality later in life” for 
Ugandan youth.103 Also, those children who are indoctrinated into armed groups at a 
younger age have a lower chance of returning to education after conflict.104 Therefore, a 
child’s ability to acquire basic vocational skills and maintain an occupation are damaged, 
which can lead to problems during reintegration. 
2. Psychological 
Being constantly subjected to violence in a war-affected environment can harm 
children’s mental health, leading to disorders like Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
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or severe personality changes. PTSD is a mental health condition that can be prompted by 
undergoing or observing a frightening event. Symptoms include “eating and sleeping 
problems, increased autonomic arousal (sweating, raised heartbeat, and concentration 
difficulties), foreshortened sense of future (small children can express hopelessness in 
relation to ever growing up), recklessness and risk-taking behavior, hyperactivity, 
withdrawal, defiance, aggression, and also numerous psychosomatic complaints.”105 
Additional symptoms include recollections of traumatic events, distressing dreams or 
nightmares and, in extreme cases, psychosis.  
Schubert and Elbert found through diagnostic interviews or therapeutic work with 
previously captured children and child soldiers in Northern Uganda and the DRC, that 
PTSD victims have developed a “fear network, composed of interconnected, trauma-
related memories, in which even only peripherally related trauma stimuli can cause a 
cascading fear response with flash-back properties.”106 They also claim that repeated 
exposure to trauma incidents can predict mental health issues. Children who participate in 
warfare may experience torment, fighting, gunfire, kidnapping, exploitation, rape, death, 
hunger, unsanitary conditions, and more. The probability of developing PTSD increases 
with the number of distressing events experienced, which is especially true among child 
soldiers who are usually victims of multiple traumatic events. For example, Derluyn and 
colleagues reported a 97% prevalence of clinically significant posttraumatic stress 
reactions in former child soldiers, among which “39% had to kill a person themselves and 
77% had witnessed killings while in captivity.”107 Additionally, Ovuga, Oyok, and Moro 
used a Harvard Trauma Questionnaire alongside the Hopkins Symptom Check-List for 
Depression and discovered out of 102 former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) child 
soldiers, “eighty-nine children (87.3%) reported having experienced ten or more war-
related traumatic psychological events; 55.9% of the children suffered from symptoms of 
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post-traumatic stress disorder; and 88.2% experienced symptoms of depressed mood.”108 
Lastly, 239 children in Gaza ages 6–11 were subjected to the Gaza Traumatic Event 
Checklist and the Child Post Traumatic Stress Reaction Index. Thabet and Vostanis found 
that “174 children (72.8%) reported PTSD reactions of at least mild intensity, while 98 
(41%) reported moderate/severe PTSD reactions.”109 The authors of these studies 
emphasize that the best forecaster of PTSD rates and severity in children is the number of 
traumatic and distressing events they have experienced.  
Taking the information provided in these studies, one can predict that the children 
who were either born in or brought to ISIS territory have a high risk for developing 
PTSD.110 Known for its brutality and violence, ISIS has subjected many children to the 
horrors of warfare. Of course, the likelihood of developing PTSD will be tailored to each 
individual and depend on the number and severity of traumatic incidents he or she has 
faced. Still, deradicalization and disengagement strategies for these children will absolutely 
need to include psychological treatment measures. Even once violence has fully ceased, a 
child’s ability to fully function and develop in a healthy manner can be disrupted. The 
following includes other damages besides PTSD, although some are linked to it, that a child 
solider can face. 
a. Depression and suicidality  
A child participating in warfare is more likely to exhibit symptoms of depression 
and suicidality. In 2007, Anvita Bhardwaj and colleagues asked 258 former child soldiers 
from the People’s War in Nepal to take part in longitudinal study lasting over 5 years. The 
goal of the study was to determine if the child’s feelings of suicide were influenced by the 
interpersonal violence (IPV) they experienced as being soldiers in the war. Of the 258 
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children, “1 in 5 (19%) reported suicidal ideation, 5.2% (n = 15) reported plans of suicide, 
and 4.1% (n = 12) reported a suicide attempt.”111 Ultimately, the prevalence of suicidal 
ideations among child soldiers who were victims of IPV was 24.7%; this is 12.2% higher 
than the control group of civilian children interviewed. Another study conducted by 
Pfeiffer and Elbert in 2007 revealed similarly high rates of suicidality among former child 
soldiers in Northern Uganda. Their study included 1,114 children of which 34%  exhibited 
a risk of suicidality and of those 17% were at clinically high risk. The children who were 
held captive for the longest were classified separately and they raised the initial rate of 34% 
to 37%, of those 25% became classified as high risk.112 Former child soldiers may 
experience this due to a lack of adequate coping or interpersonal skills. Oftentimes, they 
are unable to communicate frustration, anger, and sadness and may have a hard time 
placing trust in supportive relationships with adults. 
b. Disassociation  
Disassociation occurs when individuals experience a discontinuity in normal 
psychological functions such as memory, motor control, perception, and identity. While 
researchers have provided different explanations of disassociation, one point that remains 
clear is that trauma-related PTSD increases the likelihood of disassociation, perhaps 
because disengaging from the external world is a quick and effortless response to the agony 
of trauma.113 Children will struggle to handle minor stresses if disassociation is their 
learned coping mechanism because disassociation disconnects them from reality and can 
impede their ability to overcome life’s continual and unexpected challenges. If the children 
currently displaced by ISIS eventually become repatriated with their host countries, those 
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that exhibit dissociative behavior will continue to interact with other children in 
inconsistent and unresponsive ways, which may induce harmful action.  
c. Anti-social and Disruptive Behavior  
Even after violence has ceased, children continue to exhibit complications in 
regulating aggressive urges and handling life without resorting to violent means. In his 
book Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection, Wessels shows that children who have 
been relocated to their homes can continue to display hostility towards their communities 
or families.114 This may be because both unforgiving home and communal environments, 
created by the isolation and condemning of former child soldiers, are linked to the initiation 
of antisocial tendencies in youth.115 For example, children in Iraq who are suspected of 
having links to ISIS are arrested and detained by Kurdish forces who proceed to torture or 
coerce confession out of them. A boy of 17 voiced to Human Rights Watch, “You have 
many kids detained based on fabricated testimonies. Once they are released, maybe they 
will take revenge on the government and the people who took them to prison.”116 There is 
also a link between child soldiers experiencing and perpetrating more types of violence 
than adult former combatants that consequently increases their appetitive aggression.117 
The longer a child is exposed to extreme violence and grows up with an armed group, the 
more their perception of violence can shift to favor it as an acceptable way to achieve their 
goals or interact with others, limiting their ability to reintegrate successfully. 
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d. Transgenerational Effects  
Children are also indirectly affected through a parent’s exposure to trauma or 
PTSD. Studies on combat veterans in the Vietnam era discloses that their offspring will 
have immoderate levels of behavioral issues because combat veterans who experience war-
zone related PTSD may rely upon emotional numbing strategies to detach themselves from 
reality, thus diminishing family relationships and meaningful involvement.118 This can 
ultimately drive the children of the veteran into cycles of frustration, withdrawal, and 
avoidance. Furthermore, a child’s gene expression, brain development, hippocampal 
plasticity volume, responses to stress, and endocrine development can be altered, 
depending on the quality of attachment to their mothers and how well she cares for 
them.119 Additionally, maternal behavior can also impact how fearfulness and nurturance 
are transmitted amongst generations.120 Therefore, living in a war zone can cause parents 
to develop post-traumatic signs of emotional numbing, which in turn can inhibit their 
ability to provide their children with secure attachments and emotional closeness. Thus, 
not addressing the situation of the parents as well as child soldiers themselves can 
inadvertently pass on post-traumatic symptoms for generations.  
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has highlighted the numerous factors that can propel children into 
radicalization and that using children in armed conflict can induce a myriad of 
complications for them. Whether children face structural-level issues, are pressured 
socially through group mechanism, or make the individual decision to join violent 
extremist groups, children eventually face the second-order effects of joining such groups. 
From physical health and psychological wellness to education, children are particularly at 
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risk for suffering. There is no question that the children of ISIS have been subjected to 
traumatic experiences; therefore, it is highly likely that they will exhibit multiple 
problematic symptoms if not addressed. This means that the countries who plan to accept 
these children back, and attempt to deradicalize them, will have to draft specifically tailored 
programs in order to address their unique needs. These issues will be touched on again in 
Chapter IV when a connection is drawn between the effectiveness of deradicalization 
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III. AN ANALYSIS ON DERADICALIZATION 
AND DISENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
At no time in the past five decades has there been more focus on deradicalization 
and disengagement programs than today. The goal of deradicalization is to get an 
individual to change his or her mindset about supporting terrorism and relinquish his or her 
radical ideological beliefs. The goal of disengagement is to get an individual to shift their 
behavior away from supporting or actively participating with terrorist groups. Although 
terrorism and the study of it existed before September 11th, this monumental event turned 
terrorism studies into an industry. An article done by Andrew Silke in 2009 reveals the 
enormous increases in funding and number of researchers the discipline of terrorism studies 
received after 9/11. For example, the number of books published with the word “terrorism” 
in the title went from less than 50 per year to 300, the percentage of collaborative research 
went from 14% to 26%, and the percentage of literature focusing on al-Qaeda and militant 
Islamist groups went from 23% to 58%.121 Now that foreign fighters are returning home 
(or attempting to) from Syria and Iraq equipped with the rudimentary skills to conduct 
terrorist attacks at home, studies on deradicalization and disengagement have become 
increasingly relevant. The new emphasis given to deradicalization and disengagement is 
part of a larger effort by states to undermine the appeal of terrorist groups and delegitimize 
their violent tactics and rhetoric while limiting the pool of potential recruits for these 
organizations.122 Also, these avenues have become an option for states to offer extremists, 
as opposed to kinetic options that rely on killing and incarcerating terrorists.123 Depending 
on the country, different professionals or entities will be in charge of running these 
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programs. Unfortunately, research on deradicalization and disengagement programs is still 
minimal, and a concrete number of current programs is not available. Furthermore, 
although these efforts have received considerable attention, programs remain under 
researched, unclear, and contentious. The way in which they are designed, implemented, 
and practiced in the real world is difficult to assess and “their effectiveness has not 
undergone independent scrutiny and its degree is largely a matter of opinion.”124 
Nonetheless, more and more people are beginning to look to deradicalization and 
disengagement programs as the new tools of counterterrorism, especially in light of the 
hundreds of returnees from ISIS. 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the literature currently available on 
deradicalization and disengagement programs to provide a solid foundation of knowledge 
for the reader. Simultaneously, a critical analysis of these programs is necessary to identify 
inconsistencies and gaps within the current research. This chapter highlights the key 
elements of these programs so that chapter four can assess whether they are adequately 
addressing the motivating factors and effects of violence on children and young adults 
discussed at length in Chapter II.  
This chapter will start by discussing what types of people run deradicalization and 
disengagement programs and further discuss why it is difficult to obtain a concrete number 
of how many programs exist. Next, it will discuss the two broad themes within these 
programs which are ideological counternarratives and social aid. Finally, the chapter will 
conclude by discussing evaluations of the effectiveness of these programs. It will argue 
that the effectiveness of deradicalization has been overstated and that the research in this 
particular subject still lacks rigorous scholarship.  
A. KEY ELEMENTS OF DERADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT 
PROGRAMS 
It is important to note that not all countries use deradicalization in congruence with 
disengagement. For some, the ideologies of radicals are never addressed, and social aid is 
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given to those who surrender or turn in weapons. This is the case in Colombia where 
reintegration and demobilization efforts do not have a specific politico-ideological 
component to them because participation in insurgent groups, mainly the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN),  is 
not necessarily ideological.125 The Colombian approach allows former insurgents the 
chance to enroll in “reincorporation programs” only after they have turned themselves into 
a government entity (police, military, justices) and are approved by an interagency 
committee (CODA). Upon approval, they can receive a pardon for their crimes, healthcare 
coverage, stipends, free education for 18 months, and up to eight million pesos to start a 
micro-enterprise.126 This example illustrates that not all programs subject members to 
deradicalization before receiving social aid for reintegration. Some program will even give 
social aid alongside the deradicalization process. This is the case in Saudi Arabia where 
the families of detained terrorist going through prison deradicalization programs are 
delivered food, social services, and granted loans.  
Nonetheless, each country that uses deradicalization or disengagement programs 
will have them tailored to the goals they are trying to achieve with extremists, including 
who manages or runs the programs. Despite the small differences, many initiatives or 
programs are managed by committees of religious leaders, doctors, psychologists, 
government officials, and security personnel who are responsible for their element of the 
program whether that is moderating radical religious beliefs, providing psychological 
counseling, maintaining physical security inside detention facilities, or providing access to 
government funding. Teachers are also incorporated into these programs and offer “classes 
and counseling on sharia law, psychology, vocational training, sociology, history, Islamic 
culture, art therapy, and athletics.”127 The UK government’s official counterterrorism 
strategy states that disengagement programs will provide “mentoring, psychological 
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support, theological and ideological advice” through the expertise of “mentors, family 
support groups, and other personnel.”128 In Sri Lanka, programs involve nongovernmental 
organizations, corporate and private sector cooperation, and mentoring programs featuring 
successful Tamil actors, businesspeople, and athletes.129 The UK counterterrorism efforts 
also involve the authorities and community representatives, such as police, social workers, 
and educational providers. In the Netherlands, a specialized disengagement and 
reintegration initiative run by “team TER” (Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization) 
within the Dutch Probation Service (Reclassering Nederland) involves law enforcement, 
AIVD security officials, public prosecuting authorities (Openbaar Ministerie), and mental 
healthcare providers to help individuals with jihadist backgrounds during detention and 
after release to ensure successful reintegration back into society.130 Saudi Arabia’s prison 
based deradicalization program, which Assistant Interior Minister Prince Muhammad bin 
Nayef introduced in 2004, is run by Islamic clerics, psychologists, prison staff, therapist, 
and family support groups.131 It has been much easier for scholars to obtain information 
on who is running these programs; however, the number of programs currently operating 
worldwide is up for debate. 
While no definitive number exists, according to a survey conducted by the Counter 
Terrorism Implementation Task Force in 2009, at least 34 out of 192 United Nation 
member states claimed to have some sort of deradicalization or disengagement policies in 
place during the first decade of the 21st century.132 This includes Muslim majority 
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countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, Pakistan, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, and Morocco. It also includes Muslim minority countries 
such as Singapore, Austria, Norway, Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Romania, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, United States, and the UK. Since 2009, the number of 
countries claiming to have adopted these policies and programs has increased. However, 
the reason the finite number of programs is not known is because many programs exist in 
secrecy.133 Some are the innovations of individuals hoping to positively manage a group 
of terrorists for the sake of doing good, while others consist of entrepreneurial individuals 
working creatively within prison or police settings. On the other hand, there are programs 
that allow journalist to chat with “model” prisoners or academics to take tours of the 
facility. These programs are usually extensive across-the-board and receive adequate 
amounts of funding (more often than not by governments).134 Still, other programs can 
hardly be considered formal at all and may be run by locals within the same village. Future 
research should attempt to create a database to track the number of programs in each 
country because this can improve the ability of operators and responders to detect and 
assess deradicalization and disengagement efforts. 
1. Ideology 
The most prominent theme that appears in the literature describing elements of 
deradicalization and disengagement programs is ideological counternarratives. The idea of 
ideological counternarratives is to take a radicalized individual and subject him or her to 
more moderate views through credible religious leaders working in conjunction with 
therapist, social workers, healthcare providers, and mentors, more often than not, through 
prison reform programs. These religious leaders engage the extremists in dialogue to 
provide them with different truths that undermine terrorist ideologies and get the individual 
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to abandon their radical views all together. Countries like Yemen, Saudi Arabia, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, and Great Britain offer a few examples of how this is achieved. 
Yemen’s dialogue committee enlists the help of trusted Islamic scholars (ulema) 
who use the Quran to delegitimize the ideas of detained radicals. The ulema teach detainees 
that killing other Muslims or innocent people is forbidden by God, that a democratically 
elected president is in line with the Islamic religion, and that the legislation of Yemen 
follows Sharia.135 In Saudi Arabia, clerics promote peaceful interpretations of Islam 
through structured lectures supplemented by Quran recitations.136 They also engage 
detainees in open debate about religious issues to re-educate extremists and allow them to 
repent and abandon terrorist ideologies through limited psychological counseling. 
However, those terrorists with blood on their hands are not released from the program. In 
their study of deradicalization programs and how they impact Muslim majority states, 
Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan explain how Bangladesh uses a mixture of propaganda, 
television programs, and newspapers to put out peaceful messages, sermons, and counter 
extremism narratives to madrassa students and to those individuals the authorities believe 
are prone to radicalism.137 Although these programs have an intended target, the 
propaganda, seminars, and workshops are open to the public. Often times the events are 
disguised as innocuous topics like Islam and peace when the actual focus is on the negative 
characteristics of terrorism. Back in 1997, Egypt used religious intermediaries scholars 
from Al Azhar University and from the Muslim Brotherhood to convince leaders of the 
largest armed Islamist movement (al-Gama-al-Islamiyya) to give up violence, halt terrorist 
activity, and promote deradicalization.138 It was not until 2003 that the leaders of this 
terrorist organization were able to reestablish, rewrite, and publish new ideological 
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literature that focused on rejecting violence and abandoning jihad, that members of this 
terrorist group began to comply with deradicalization efforts.  
In Great Britain, the objective of one element of the governments over-arching 
counterterrorism strategy CONTEST is to challenge the ideology that supports terrorism 
and those who promote it. This element is called “Prevent,” and attempts to address 
ideology by disproving the claims made by terrorist groups and challenging terrorist and 
associated extremist narratives “through projects in education, communities and the 
criminal justice system (prison and probation); and through support for experts where 
ideology misrepresents theology and requires a detailed response.”139 For example, the 
Positive Street Project (PSP) created a drop-in center for youth where local Imams and 
Muslim leaders helped guide youth away from radical ideologies and taught moderate 
interpretations of Islam through coordinated debate about hot topics and controversial ideas 
the youth were facing.140 
The overall goal of including ideological counternarratives into deradicalization 
and disengagement programs is to get the radicalized individual to discontinue supporting 
and engaging in violence based on extremist interpretations of religion. Ideological 
deradicalization is especially important to maintain disengagement from a terrorist group 
because there is ultimately a link between radical thoughts and action. Once an individual 
makes the decision to minimize the means and opportunities to actively engage in terrorist 
groups (they leave the group), moderate ideology can help create and maintain separation 
from radical groups. Creating that cognitive shift in ideas through deradicalization 
minimizes the chances that an individual sympathizes with or justifies terrorist activities. 
Also, when enough individuals renounce a radical ideology, the groups that continue to 
adhere to this ideology are largely discredited.141  
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2. Social Aid 
A second aspect of many deradicalization and disengagement programs is social 
aid. Social aid refers to state sponsored assistance in the form of monetary support, 
guidance, vocational training, food, clothing, and more such as, arranging marriages and 
paying dowry, that is intended to help an individual meet their basic needs. This aid is 
given to former detainees once they have gone through deradicalization efforts (although 
this is not always the case) and are assessed to be successfully rehabilitated. How then is 
ideology connected to social aid? Before an extremist can receive aid from the state, the 
state must ensure that the individual will not abuse that aid and defect to supporting terrorist 
organizations. Therefore, upfront efforts are aimed at delegitimizing radical ideologies and 
promoting more moderate ones. Once an individual accepts and demonstrate adherence to 
moderate views, social aid is offered to help the individual reintegrate economically and 
socially back into society. By doing so, the individual is less likely to resort to terrorism if 
basic needs such as food, shelter, and monetary support are guaranteed. However, middle-
aged individuals who are career terrorist are at a higher risk of re-engaging in terrorism 
despite social aid because they possess strong ideological commitments, have limited 
alternatives outside of the terrorist group, or have acquired “sunk costs” due to prolonged 
involvement in these groups.142 These risk factors make it more difficult for these 
particular individuals to stay disengaged from terrorism, but the goal remains the same.  
The overall goal of these programs is to help a former detainee with social and 
economic reintegration. For example, Saudi Arabia’s approach to this aspect of 
deradicalization has gained global attention, even the United States has described the 
program as “the best role model for detention facilities.”143 The program delivers food and 
clothing, distributes loans, supports marriage ceremonies, and offers amnesty to former 
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detainees and their families.144 The idea being once an individual has renounced extremist 
views and has adopted moderate ones, social and economic reintegration should reduce the 
likelihood of returning to terrorism. Other deradicalization and disengagement programs 
in Sweden, Norway, Bangladesh, and Malaysia offer former fighters social aid in the form 
of vocational workshops or educational classroom activities that help sustain an alternative 
lifestyle conducive to preventing recidivism.145 For example, in Bangladesh, madrassa 
students who are having a hard time finding employment are offered vocational training in 
areas like mechanics, air conditioning mechanics, and plumbing.146 In Exit Sweden, youth 
attempting to separate themselves from the White Power scene are linked with a former 
neo-Nazi who then helps that individual establish a “normal life” by engaging in joint 
activities with other youth from mainstream backgrounds.147 This is usually done in a 
classroom setting and the goal is to help the separating youth stay disengaged from crime 
and violence by rebuilding stable social networks and trust with authority. 
B. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DERADICALIZATION AND 
DISENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIES 
This thesis does not focus on creating a framework in which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of deradicalization or disengagement programs. This would entail creating 
empirically valid metrics to measure behavioral changes in people or the effects of long-
term intervention and deciding which external entity will conduct evaluations and how 
much transparency and access to information they will receive. Still, it is still important to 
address the perceived successes of these programs. Most countries that implement these 
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efforts claim that their programs are effective, however little empirical support follows 
these claims and a clear picture of what constitutes success is not available.148  
For example, Yemen’s dialogue committee was initiated to create a forum for 
radicals to discuss topics with clerics who attempted to get these radicals to moderate their 
extremists’ views. However, little data existed on the characteristics or demographics of 
those radicals going through the program, which made evaluating it harder.149 Also, 
Yemeni officials claimed that the country saw a decrease in violent terrorist attacks from 
2002, the start of the program, to 2006. However, Yemen saw a resurgence of terrorist 
activity during 2006 which brought the criteria being used for judging the successes of their 
programs into question. Yemeni officials assumed their deradicalized and disengaged 
program participants were not returning to militancy despite a lack of tracking data. Saudi 
Arabia’s counseling program is another example of a program with questionable success 
rates. While Saudi officials claim a 90% success rate, the empirical evidence to support 
this number does not exist, which makes the number seem largely overestimated. The 
kingdom has not allowed outside officials to conduct separate evaluations of their program 
and they admit that they do not have full accountability of the detainees they release.150 
This suggest that it is possible some former detainees returned to militancy and that the 
program is unsuccessful. In Bangladesh, the governments criteria for success takes into 
account the quantity of terrorist attacks, the degree of violence within local communities, 
and the amount of individuals being recruited into religious-based extremism.151 While 
the government has claimed each of these has declined, it is difficult to determine whether 
that is due to the implementation of deradicalization and disengagement efforts or the 
hardline policies the government has taken, such as the use of force to apprehend terrorist 
or the enactment of the death penalty as a deterrent. Furthermore, the entire operation of 
the program is extremely covert and almost no Bangladeshi citizens know it exist and there 
is hardly any public information available via the Internet. The little information that is 
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made available is usually by the entities running the program, so the claimed successes of 
their program have not been externally validated.  
In the UK, officials have received massive public scrutiny about the Prevent 
strategy because of the second and third-order counterproductive impacts it has created. 
This sits in contrast to security minister Ben Wallace’s comments that the program is 
helping “save lives” and has seen “real results” in helping channel individuals away from 
terrorism.152 However, the public believes it unfairly stigmatizes Muslim populations as 
communities of suspicion, disincentivizes sharing information with the police, and 
alienates the very people it was designed to help.153 For example, in 2015 under Prevent 
the government introduced a statutory duty on state employees (teachers, local authorities, 
medical personnel, law enforcement) to report any suspicions or apprehensions about 
people they feel may be at risk for turning to extremism or radicalization. This led to 
multiple cases of children being reported by teachers for wearing T-shirts with slogans 
mistaken as ISIS propaganda, for wearing “Free-Palestine” badges, or for reading books 
with the word terrorism in the title.154 Overall, it has left Muslim parents and children alike 
feeling alienated and scared to express themselves, practice their religion, or trust those 
around them especially the security apparatus. 
Although these are not the only programs facing these issues, they highlight the 
questionable success rates of deradicalization and disengagement programs. Of course, the 
authorities who manage these programs continue to make unwavering claims of success; 
however, many of these claims are grounded on questionably low recidivism rates. This is 
problematic because calculating the recidivism rates of former terrorists who have been 
released from detention is tremendously difficult since “there are no national databases that 
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record such information or any baseline measure to which one can actually compare,”155 
and as pointed out by Marsden, “lack of recidivism should not automatically be taken to 
mean that the intervention has been influential.”156 Ascertaining whether these programs 
are successful and why will be challenging for the following reasons: (1) initiatives have 
not adopted clear criteria’s or benchmarks for success, (2) data linked to these initiatives is 
scarce making it difficult for authentic independent sources to validate, and (3) the 
scholarship dedicated to these programs lacks methodical, organized, and collective study 
efforts.157 
Unfortunately, many deradicalization and disengagement strategies lack scientific 
evaluation and formal comparison on top of questionable claims of success. Allard R. 
Feddes and Marcello Gallucci attempted to highlight this issue by conducting a literature 
review on 55 manuscripts with over 135 samples that included qualitative or quantitative 
evaluations on programs intended to prevent (further) radicalization or carry out de-
radicalization. Their review revealed that the data within the manuscripts was regularly 
anecdotal (49%) in which “no explicit reference to theory and no empirical quantitative or 
qualitative data was reported.”158 Only 16 out of 35 samples (12%) presented either 
numerical or characterizing raw data from first-hand sources. Looking beyond Feddes and 
Gallucci’s sample, terrorism studies as a whole lack evaluations based on theory, empirical 
data collection, experimental research designs, objective goal testing through control 
groups, and multiple-instrument hypothesis testing. Research of this sort is abundant in 
terrorism studies, making it weak from a methodological standpoint and behind current 
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standards in other social sciences. Marc Sageman goes so far as to claim, “academic 
terrorism research has stagnated for the past dozen years because of a lack of both primary 
sources and vigorous efforts to police the quality of research.”159 Evaluations of 
deradicalization and disengagement strategies should do the following: (1) utilize a mixed-
method approach that collects and integrates qualitative and quantitative data, (2) create 
hypotheses so they can be tested empirically, and (3) use multiple data collection tools such 
as surveys, observations, interviews, focus groups, and experiments. Still, on a positive 
note, the creativity that led to these initiatives cannot be lost and this literature review has 
hopefully shed light on areas where more empirical analysis can be done. 
C. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, the literature on deradicalization and disengagement programs is 
focused around two major themes, ideology and social aid. Heavy emphasis is put on the 
ideological aspect of the programs, which usually consist of religious personnel engaging 
in dialogue with radical individuals in order to get them to abandon terrorist ideologies and 
adopt more moderate views. While not all programs offer social aid, the ones that do aim 
to diminish the barriers individuals face when exiting an extremist group and foster the 
social reintegration of these individuals back into society. Unfortunately, deradicalization 
and disengagement strategies continue to be questioned and current programs continue to 
provide less than concrete results of success.  
While the number of programs appears to be increasing around the world, there 
appears to be a disjuncture between the very affiliative factors—social networks, kinships 
ties, the search for an identity, and the psychological characteristics of adolescents—that 
research suggests, are highly influential in a child’s decisions to join such organizations 
and the design and implementation of current programs.160 Chapter IV will further explore 
the efficacy of current programs and begin to question whether they can successfully be 
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applied and offered to the children currently attempting to return home from the former 
territory of the Islamic State. Based on the factors that motivate children to join terrorist 
organization and the design, implementation, and outcomes of current programs, the 
likelihood that they can effectively deradicalize and reintegrate children is unlikely.  
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IV. DERADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
APPLIED TO CHILDREN 
This thesis has sought to answer the following questions: are current 
deradicalization and disengagement programs applicable to the children of ISIS? Would 
those programs help to reintegrate children back into society? Is a different approach 
needed? This thesis began by exploring why children join terrorist groups to begin with, 
and the consequences of such actions. It also looked at the literature describing 
deradicalization and disengagement programs to deduce what strategies or policies are 
being used to reintegrate former combatants into society. Based on this information, it 
appears that current programs would most likely be unsuccessful or at best partially 
successful, in effectively deradicalizing or disengaging children from ISIS. This is not to 
say that the ideological and social aid aspects of current programs should be completely 
tossed, however programs must reconsider the importance they place on these two aspects 
and adopt tailored responses for the unique needs of children. This final chapter will borrow 
heavily from the analysis of earlier chapters to help determine whether current programs 
are applicable to the children currently returning from ISIS. 
A. CAN CURRENT PROGRAMS HELP CHILDREN? 
The question of whether current programs can effectively deradicalize, disengage, 
and reintegrate children remains. Based on what we know about current programs and why 
children get involved and the consequences of that involvement, this thesis contends that 
current programs are largely ineffective for children. Because they are largely prison based, 
place heavy emphasis on ideology, and provide untailored aid to participants, the design 
and implementation of current deradicalization and disengagement programs are ignoring 
the very affiliative factors––social networks, the sense of community and belonging, and 
psychological characteristic of adolescents–– that research suggests are immensely 
influential in a child’s decision to join extremist groups. They also ignore the unique effects 
that involvement with terrorism has on children.  
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1. Aspects of Deradicalization and Disengagement Programs Applicable 
to Children 
For starters, not all aspects of deradicalization and disengagement programs are 
ineffective. The agreement that counterterrorism efforts need to go beyond traditional 
intelligence and security measures to fight Islamic terrorism suggest that having these 
programs in the first place is a step in the right direction. They address the growing 
consensus that efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former terrorists is just as important as 
kinetic responses to terrorism. The collapse of the caliphate has brought this idea to the 
forefront since large numbers of men, women, and children are seeking to return to their 
host countries. For children, the need for deradicalization, disengagement, and 
reintegration is even more urgent since they are at such a pivotal development stage in their 
lives and require unique types of care when compared to adults. For children, the 
availability of such programs will be crucial to improve their chances of being able to live 
a normal life, particularly as many are orphans because their parents are dead or 
imprisoned. 
Second, it is clear through propaganda, media coverage, and interviews that the 
children of ISIS have be socialized in multiple ways into the group’s radical ideology and 
methods of violence. In 2015, ISIS developed a new curriculum for school age children 
that focused heavily on religion. The syllabus focused on reading the Quran, promoting the 
Islamic caliphate, and Sharia and military training such as weapons handling, ammunitions, 
and fighting tactics.161 NBC News interviewed a former IS teacher who stated “I was 
teaching them to become a young terrorist. I was simply brainwashing them.”162 The goal 
of this new K-12 education was to incite violence and extremism by radicalizing young 
minds and indoctrinating them into the ideology of ISIS early on. Beyond school, children 
are exposed to brutal physical training meant to deepen their loyalty through hardships, 
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sacrifice, and discipline.163 Therefore, programs for children will still need to address 
radical ideologies and attempt to delegitimize the teachings of the Islamic State. The same 
goes for social aid. Most forms of aid will be critical to the survival of children. For 
example, food, water, shelter, and clothing will be key to fulfilling an individual’s 
hierarchy of needs. Other forms of aid like education or life-skills workshops will help with 
the reintegration processes later down the road. Nonetheless, programs are still designed 
and implemented in ways that are not conducive for the reintegration of children.  
2. Aspects of Deradicalization and Disengagement Programs 
Inapplicable to Children 
While many can agree youth should be held accountable for their actions, it must 
be done so in a developmentally appropriate way that considers their young age as well as 
their individual characteristics and behaviors. Putting aside the argument of whether 
juvenile prisons are just, it has been demonstrated that prisons can facilitate the adoption 
of extreme or radicalized beliefs and open the door to recruitment into violent groups. 
While the risk of this occurring is often overstated, it still stands that “prisons may serve 
as locations in which violent extremism can thrive” and where prisoners can be “radicalized 
to violence or where violent extremist prisoners who are co-located can form closer 
relationships, more cohesive networks and mutual reinforcement of violent extremist 
beliefs.”164 While imprisoned, youth may experience crises of self-understanding, feelings 
of rejection by native or host society, and may be integrated into new, delinquent and 
defensive, group identities.165 Therefore, subjecting radicalized young adults to prison 
environments where they are physically and psychologically in danger may compound 
their vulnerability to further radicalization or engagement with terrorist groups.  
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Furthermore, current programs place a heavy emphasis on addressing ideology. 
While ideology is important, it is only one of many risk factors that contribute to 
radicalization. Research has shown that ideology alone is not the strongest motivating 
factor for joining extremist groups. Peter Neumann states “While extremists can find potent 
motivation at the nexus of grievance and ideology, taking the step from mere radicalism to 
violent extremism is much more difficult without the aid of social structures and 
groups.”166 People who harbor radical ideas seldom act on them and even militant jihadists 
have cursory understandings of the radicalized ideology they represent and are not 
considered especially “pious.”167 For youth, social structures, peer networks, and family 
ties contribute the most to the radicalization process. Youth who associate with peers who 
engage in delinquency or exhibit patterns of aggressive and antisocial behavior are at 
higher risks for joining criminal groups like gangs or terrorist groups. Once these friendship 
networks hit a peak of cohesion, they cut off communication with outsiders and turn inward 
to radicalize even further. Moreover, children who are exposed to terrorism at a young age, 
whether that be through family members who are members of a terrorist group or through 
those that support terrorist activities, are more likely to join themselves. Thus, programs 
should consider substituting strategies that address ideology for ones that address positive 
peer contacts and networking. 
Although social aid is vital to disengagement and reintegration, for children it is 
coming at the expense of psychological counseling, guidance, and aftercare. We know that 
children experience unique social and cognitive psychological developments when 
compared to adults. Children are at a stage in their life where their decision-making skills 
and ability to think rationally are not fully developed. In general, youth take more risks 
than adults which can lead to harmful consequences, especially since youth are more likely 
to adopt overly hostile, distressing, or even dangerous responses to violence that threatens 
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their physical or psychological well-being.168 For example, children whose risking taking 
behavior exposes them to physical, emotional, or sexual forms of violence are more likely 
to adopt responses where they avert physical touch, attempt suicide or self-mutilation, lash 
out through aggressive tantrums or rages, refuse to eat, withdrawal themselves from social 
activities, or begin to abuse illegal substances.169 Youth are also experiencing intense 
explorations of self-identity, personal values, goals, and beliefs. Youthful rebellion, 
impulsive curiosity, identity quarrels, and estrangement from parents are the characteristics 
of young people that terrorist organizations seek to take advantage of. This cognitive stage 
of adolescents allows terrorist groups to offer youth a sense of community and camaraderie, 
and the chance to be recognized giving them a perception of significance. Therefore, 
disengagement programs should emphasize offering advice and guidance to youth from 
within a framework of their unique religious and cultural backgrounds.  
We also know that children and child soldiers are more adversely affected by the 
gruesome results of terrorism and association with terrorist groups. Because children rely 
on parental care, being stripped from their families and loved ones can create unstable 
emotional voids. Children are also prone to losing out on a formal education and becoming 
displaced inside refugee camps alongside their parents. Even after violence, children find 
it harder to control their aggressive impulses because early on they disassociated 
themselves to cope with trauma, making minor stressors and life activities much harder to 
deal with. Thus, social aid such as vocational workshops, loans, business partnerships, and 
marriage arrangements are not helpful to children when they need the empathy and 
attachment of their parents and early forms of formal education to develop, and lack the 
ability to socialize or cope with minor stresses. 
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3. How to Improve Deradicalization and Disengagement Programs for 
Children 
Programs designed for children should consider alternatives to detention and 
imprisonment. The World Bank has attempted to address this issue by setting guidelines 
for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs where “child soldiers 
must be separated from military authority and protected through the establishment of 
special reception centres during demobilization, as long as their stay prior to being reunited 
with their families and communities is as short as possible.”170 For example, some DDR 
programs have Interim Care Centres (ICC) for children that are run by both local and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).171 Likewise, special efforts should 
be made to reach out and release those children inside detention facilities who are being 
held alongside radical ISIS supporters since they are vulnerable to recruitment.172 These 
special centers create an age-appropriate environment for children to disengage from 
terrorism.  
It is clear that programs are failing to address the primary motivating forces that 
propel children to join terrorist groups, namely family, peer networks, and social identity. 
Take the case of Belgian children for example. They started feeling marginalized from their 
host society, turned to like-minded peers who gave them a unique sense of identity 
associated with the Islamic struggle in Syria, and eventually made the decision to join ISIS 
through their peer networks. If these forces are not addressed, these children, and many 
others, can end up being influenced by the same original factors and return to affiliating 
with terrorism. This is especially true in the age of social media where connecting with 
peers and associating with delinquent groups is even faster and easier than ever before. 
Therefore, programs should address social networks by fostering positive intergroup 
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contact. One way to do this is to create spaces for dialogue at the most basic level of 
activity. Emilia Aiello and colleagues suggest that this grassroots dialogue can be most 
effective if it adopts the following four elements: “providing guidance to being safe in the 
exploration of extremist messages and violent radicalization; the rejection of violence; that 
dialogue is egalitarian; and that relationships in these spaces for dialogue are built on trust 
so that adolescents and young adults feel confident to raise their doubts.”173 This dialogue 
can be a part of deradicalization and disengagement programs, but also target youth at large 
to prevent radicalization from occurring. Additionally, disengagement programs should 
afford peer groups, especially marginalized groups, the opportunity for civic engagement. 
Children who joined the Islamic State were pushed by a desire to escape structural 
difficulties and pulled by the chance to partake in adventure and be a part of a larger cause. 
Integrating civic participation into current disengagement programs would allow youth to 
create positive relationships with their communities, foster adult partnerships with youth 
leaders, and address structural disparities.174 Youth civic engagement can also give 
individuals a meaningful sense of agency and stake in political activities. The intention 
here is to create positive intergroup contact and give peer groups healthy outlets of 
expression. 
Although psychological explanations have been downplayed when considering 
why adults join terrorist groups, the psychology of children is vastly different and plays a 
much larger role in explaining their decision making. At such a young age children have 
not yet developed the mental capacity to suppress impulsive behaviors or make rational 
judgements. This, paired with the fact many youth experience intense explorations of self, 
may make terrorist groups appealing. In the context of Islam, youth may be interested in 
learning more about their heritage, becoming closer to their religion, and understanding 
how to interact with non-Muslim counterparts in a religiously diverse environment. Radical 
Islamist or terrorist groups should not be the only sources of guidance where “young people 
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are receiving guidance calculated to disrupt integration, foster hostility and make their own 
lives more difficult.”175 While going through a program, credible religious leaders, 
counselors, and peers should be utilized to guide youth through day-to-day activities and 
through a positive self-identification process. This will help address the individual factors 
such as mental health conditions, depression, trauma, and personality traits that originally 
made these children vulnerable to radicalization.  
Lastly, it has been documented that child soldiers are at a very high risk of 
developing PTSD due to the traumatic experiences they faced while being a part of a 
militant group. This mental health issue can cloud children with guilt, hostility, 
hypervigilance, nightmares, and more like unwanted thoughts or self-destructive 
behavior.176 While some forms of aid will be vital such as food, clothing, and shelter, 
psychologically and physically children suffer differently than adults so more emphasis 
should be placed on counseling, therapy, socialization, and education instead of teaching 
vocational skills and providing monetary support.177 For example, in Sri Lanka, one pillar 
of their six-pronged approach to rehabilitation involves educational programs for 
combatants that offer formal schooling where general certificates can be obtained or 
advanced certificates which include examinations and language training.178 Additionally, 
since children need parental support during development, efforts should be made to 
reconnect them with family members throughout the disengagement process, similar to 
what is done in Saudi Arabia, to ease the tension of resocialization. Most importantly, 
programs for youth need to consider the types of violence these children experienced and 
support sustainable and effective responses to their mental health needs. This psychological 
adjustment will be crucial to their reintegration into society.  
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B. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF CONCERN 
It has been established that current programs should discard prison-based facilities, 
abandon ideological counternarratives in favor of promoting positive outlets for peer 
networks, and shift from providing untailored social aid to providing psychological/trauma 
counseling and guidance. Still, there are several other areas of concern that programs can 
address to increase the likelihood of success when applied to children.  
First, make sure the people are ungrudgingly ready to accept and integrate these 
children back into the folds of society. Even if a child has gone through a deradicalization 
or disengagement program, a hostile community can drive them back to isolation and into 
the cycle of terrorist affiliation once more. A study conducted by Theresa Betancourt, at 
Harvard’s School of Public Health, asserts that “community acceptance was an important 
predictor of reduced depression” among former child combatants over time “as well as 
improvements in prosocial attitudes and confidence.”179 These findings speak to the 
heightened importance of educating the community on the sensitivity of child soldiers 
returning home and how constructive community acceptance can lead to positive future 
outlooks for the children. 
Second, children will need to delegitimize their old way of living, which can be 
achieved through creating new bonds of friendship and community ties. Therefore, avenues 
must be created for children to socialize through legal means during the disengagement 
process. For example, allowing kids to participate in sports teams can provide them with 
opportunities to work together but also keep them away from violent narratives and social 
isolation. This has been the case for former child soldiers in Sri Lanka where respect, trust, 
and team building is facilitated through playing, coaching, and watching cricket.180 The 
path to rehabilitation cannot merely focus on changing a mindset of an individual, it must 
foster positive social relationships and shift personal circumstances. 
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Third, in the age of technology, future programs should consider offering outlets 
for youth to socialize and engage other like-minded youth through social media sites. Since 
adolescents can be easily manipulated through the Internet, it would be wise to fund and 
expand professional chat rooms, news commentaries, and political forums dedicated to 
youth. Not only would this help those going through a program establish solid bases of 
information, it would also work beyond the immediate confines of the program to create 
an environment conducive for fostering successful reintegration. These efforts would be 
part of a larger educational campaign aimed at reducing the isolation and embitterment of 
diaspora youth.181 
Finally, seeing as ISIS was labeled as one of the most brutal and extreme terrorist 
groups to this day, special attention should be focused on trauma counseling and medical 
treatment for these returning children. Sadly, they have been exposed to the gruesome 
realities of conflict and have witnessed brutality on an unprecedented scale. Some children 
have fallen victim to these tragedies, which include being beaten, raped, maimed, shot, 
forced to use drugs, and exposed to diseases. Before a child can go through any sort of 
deradicalization or disengagement, they must regain their physical and mental health. 
Medical services need to be provided to address the injuries children may have received 
and therapy should be available for children to disassociate with conflict and regain control 
of their fate. Mental health interventions can be simple like the ones used in Northern 
Uganda for former child soldiers. Here, narrative exposure therapy (where a child gives a 
therapist an autobiography of their experiences as child soldiers) was implemented by 
therapists who had no formal mental health or medical background and it resulted in 
significant reductions of PTSD symptoms and related behaviors like depression, suicide, 
and stigmatization.182 This study highlights that mental health services can be community-
based and provided despite low levels of funding or medical professionals.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
The research conducted in this thesis has highlighted the shortcomings of 
deradicalization and disengagement programs when applied to children. Future policies 
should keep in mind the unique psychological and physical distinctions of children and 
create programs tailored to their specific needs. Programs still remain unclear, 
understudied, and contentious despite claims of success that are not externally validated or 
empirically backed. Needless to say, further research and evaluation must be done on 
deradicalization and disengagement programs to truly evaluate their success rates and 
implementation strategies. From there, it can be determined whether to further expand and 
fund current programs or restructure/reorganize them all together in search of new 
solutions. This thesis is produced at a time of great uncertainty. Hundreds of men, woman, 
and children are being displaced from the collapse of the proclaimed caliphate and their 
futures remain unknown. Very few countries have plans to accept former ISIS supporters 
back, let alone provide children with special care. However, I hope this thesis has provided 
some baseline understanding of the issue’s children are facing when it comes to 
involvement with terrorism and how current deradicalization and disengagement programs 
are ill-equipped to reintegrate the children of ISIS. As for those countries that do plan to 
repatriate these children, I urge them to keep the information presented here in mind when 
they create policies that will affect a generation of youth. 
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